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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Jennifer Nicole Hull appeals from her judgment of conviction for felony DUI,
challenging the denial of her motion to suppress evidence obtained in a blood draw.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Hull was driving too fast, failed to make a tum in the road, and crashed her car,
rolling it several times. (R., p. 57.) The investigating deputy found a half-empty bottle of
vodka in the car. (R., p. 57.) He made contact with Hull in the hospital, and noted that she
smelled strongly ofhaving been drinking. (R., p. 57.) Hull admitted she had been drinking,
although she stated she could not remember how much or when. (R., p. 57.)
The deputy read Hull the administrative license suspension ("ALS") rights form,
"which included an explanation of her right to refuse evidentiary testing and the
consequences of refusal." (R., p. 57.) Both during the reading of the ALS form and
thereafter Hull "acknowledged her understanding" of her rights. (R., p. 58.) Before the
test was administered, Hull asked if it was "normal." (R., p. 58.) The nurse attending Hull
stated, "You are required by law," and the deputy reiterated that she was "required by law
to ... ," whereupon Hull stated, "Totally fine, I was just asking." (R., p. 58 (quoting Ex. 1,
at 20:35-21 :20).) The deputy then asked Hull if she remembered the part of the ALS form
"about refusing" the test. (R., p. 58.) Hull answered, "Oh, I know, I know." (R., p. 58.)
The nurse drew a blood sample which tested .34 percent blood alcohol concentration. (R.,
p. 59.)

1

The state charged Hull with a felony DUI with an enhancement for excessive
alcohol concentration and with possession of an open container. (R., pp. 21-22.) Hull
moved to suppress evidence from the blood draw. (R., pp. 32-33.)
After a hearing the district court denied the motion to suppress. (R., pp. 56-62.)
The district court concluded that “the totality of the circumstances indicate that Defendant
gave her initial statutorily derived consent voluntarily and such voluntary consent
continued through the time her blood was obtained.” (R., p. 62.)
After the district court denied her motion to suppress, Hull conditionally pleaded
guilty to felony DUI, preserving her right to appeal. (R., pp. 64-67.) The district court
sentenced Hull to five years with two fixed, but suspended execution of the judgment and
ordered five years of probation. (R., pp. 83-88.) Hull filed a timely notice of appeal. (R.,
pp. 91-94.)
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ISSUE
Hull states the issue 0n appeal

as:

Did the district court err in denying Ms. Hull’s motion to suppress
because the ofﬁcer’s claim she was required t0 submit t0 the blood test
rendered her consent involuntary and no other exception to the warrant

requirement justiﬁed the warrantless seizure 0f her blood?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 6.)

The

state rephrases the issue as:

Has Hull

failed t0 establish error in the district court’s analysis 0r clear error in

factual ﬁndings that the totality 0f the circumstances showed
have been voluntarily given?

its

Hull’s implied consent to

ARGUMENT
The Deputv’s Statements To Hull Did Not Render Her Previously Given Implied Consent
Involuntary

A.

Introduction

After the deputy informed Hull of her rights regarding refusing evidentiary testing,

and

after Hull indicated she

understood those

give [police] a blood sample.” (R., p. 58.)

and asked

if

rights,

The deputy

Hull remembered the portion 0f the

indicated she did.

(Id.)

Hull asked whether

ALS

stated she

it

was “normal

t0

was “required by law”

form discussing

refusal,

and Hull

In denying Hull’s motion t0 suppress, the district court ﬁrst

concluded that implied consent was given When Hull voluntarily drove after drinking, and
therefore “the ﬁrst hurdle of voluntariness

whether that voluntary consent was
not.

The

(Id.)

district court

(Id.)

supported by the record.”

The
(Id.)

met.”

withdrawn, and the

by

(Id.)

district court

On the

On
made

test.

concluded

it

was

was “required by law”

concluded that her argument

contrary, the record

test;

“is

t0

simply not

showed she was read

the

ALS

she indicated she understood the

and she afﬁrmed being told about her rights regarding refusal.

Moreover, Hull “made n0 attempt

taking the

The next question was

district court

the statement that she

form, which included a portion on refusal to take the
rights as set forth in the form;

(R., p. 61.)

then addressed Hull’s argument, which was “that her

continuing consent was coerced”

provide a sample.

later

is

t0 afﬁrmatively

Withdraw her consent” or

t0 resist

(Id.)

appeal Hull argues the district court employed an erroneous legal standard and

clearly erroneous factual ﬁndings. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 6- 14.) This

because the

district court

argument

fails

applied the correct legal standard and because the facts found

the district court are supported

by

the record,

show

that Hull voluntarily

by

gave her implied

when

consent

0f Whether

it

she drove on Idaho’s roads after drinking, and also

was normal

t0

show

that the discussion

submit to testing did not coerce Hull into not Withdrawing her

COIlSCIlt.

B.

Standard

Of Review

The standard of review of a suppression motion
a motion t0 suppress

is

by

trial

court’s ﬁndings 0f

State V. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 843, 103 P.3d 454,

456 (2004). “Whether consent was granted
question of fact t0 be determined by

all

162 Idaho 581, 585, 401 P.3d 581, 585

Shown No

When a decision on

substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of

constitutional principles to those facts.

Hull Has

bifurcated.

challenged, the appellate court accepts the

fact that are supported

C.

is

voluntarily, 0r

was a product of coercion,

the surrounding circumstances.”

(Ct.

is

a

State V. Greub,

App. 2017).

Clear Error In The District Court’s Finding That Her Consent

Was Voluntagy
The Fourth Amendment of the United

States Constitution provides that “[t]he right

0fthe people t0 be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”

person submit to a blood alcohol

Schmerber

V. California,

test is a

U.S. Const. amend. IV.

search and seizure under the Fourth

384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).

judicial process, Without prior approval

Requiring that a

by judge

Amendment.

“[S]earches conducted outside the

0r magistrate, are per se unreasonable

under the Fourth Amendment—subject only t0 a few speciﬁcally established and welldelineated exceptions.” Katz V. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).

Consent
Schneckloth

V.

is

a valid exception to the Fourth

Amendment’s warrant requirement.

Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). Under Idaho law, consent

may be

State V. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302-03, 160 P.3d 739, 741-42 (2007),

statutorily implied.

overruled 0n other grounds by State
implied consent

is

provided for in Idaho law, Which provides that a person

vehicle in this state

t0

Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 337 P.3d 575 (2014). Such

V.

is,

under certain circumstances that are present in

have given his consent

t0 evidentiary testing for concentration

Who

this case,

0f alcohol.”

drives a

“deemed

I.C. § 18-

8002(1).

“Inherent in the requirement that consent be voluntary

Withdraw

that consent.”

State V. Halseth, 157 Idaho 643, 646,

is

the right of the person to

339 P.3d 368, 371 (2014).

Thus, “a suspect can Withdraw his 0r her statutorily implied consent to a
presence of alcohol.” State

V. Arrotta,

For implied consent

t0

157 Idaho 773, 774, 339 P.3d 1177, 1178 (2014).

be voluntary, drivers must

(2) “continue to give voluntary consent.”

voluntarily,”

and

P.3d

“Drivers in Idaho give their

at 582.

0n Idaho roads

voluntarily.”

I_d.

test for the

(citing

initial

(1) “give their initial consent

w,

157 Idaho

at

423, 337

consent to evidentiary testing by driving

M, 144 Idaho

Idaho law, a driver’s implied consent continues

if

at

it is

303, 160 P.3d at 742). “Under

not revoked before the time of

evidentiary testing.” State V. Rios, 160 Idaho 262, 265-66, 371 P.3d 316, 319-20 (2016).

Revocation of consent

may

take the form of “reﬁlsal, protest, or objection t0 alcohol

concentration testing.” State V. Eversole, 160 Idaho 239, 242, 371 P.3d 293, 296 (2016).
“[E]ffective withdrawal of consent requires unequivocal conduct, in the

act, statement,

or

some combination 0f the two,

form of either an

that is inconsistent With the consent t0 the

search previously given.” Burton V. United States, 657 A.2d 741, 748 (D.C.1994).

The

district court

concluded that Hull did “not contest that she voluntarily drove on

Idaho roads” and “Wherefore, the ﬁrst hurdle 0f voluntariness

is

met.” (R.,

p.

61 .) There

is nothing in the record that would indicate Hull’s voluntary act of driving after drinking
did not give rise to implied consent. Thus, there was no error in the district court’s
conclusion that Hull’s initial consent was voluntary.
In determining whether the voluntary consent continued or was revoked, the district
court concluded there was no affirmative withdrawal of Hull’s consent and no protest or
objection to taking the test. (Id.) The district court further concluded that the deputy’s
statement about the blood draw being “required by law” did not, under the totality of
circumstances, show that Hull did not continue to give voluntary consent. (R., pp. 61-62.)
That totality of circumstances included: (1) the statement was made in response to a
question of whether the blood draw procedure was “normal,” (2) the statement was made
after the ALS form (which included a recitation of the right and consequences of refusal)
had been read, (3) Hull had previously stated that she understood the ALS advisory, (4) the
deputy also reminded Hull about the information regarding refusal contained in the ALS
form, and (5) Hull indicated she remembered that information. (R., p. 61.) The district
court properly concluded that Hull’s consent, given voluntarily initially, continued because
it was not revoked by refusal, protest, or objection before the time of evidentiary testing.
Hull argues her continued consent was involuntary because she merely acquiesced
to the statement that she was “required by law to ….” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 6-14.) This
argument first fails as a matter of law. As set forth above, under Idaho law consent is
granted by driving under circumstances giving rise to reasonable belief that the driver is
intoxicated, and thus Hull gave voluntary consent to evidentiary testing by voluntarily
driving after having drunk alcohol. That consent may be withdrawn by words or actions
obviously contrary to that consent, such as refusal, protest, or objection to alcohol
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concentration testing. Hull never refused, protested or obj ected, and thus did not withdraw

her consent. Hull’s argument that the ofﬁcer’s statement, taken in isolation, either rendered

her previously granted consent involuntary or effectuated a Withdrawal 0f that consent

is

without support in the law.1
Hull’s argument also fails on the facts. Before the statement in question, Hull

informed as part of the

ALS

was

information that she could refuse the test (and accept the

attendant consequence of a license suspension) and indicated she understood this. Either
as part of making the challenged statement, or immediately thereafter, the deputy

Hull about the refusal portion of the

that.

test

The

district court’s factual

ALS

ﬁnding

information and Hull indicated she

that Hull

knew about

was aware she could refuse

(and accept the attendant driver’s license suspension)

is

reminded

to take the

supported by the record. Hull

has failed to show clear error.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Court to afﬁrm the judgment ofthe

district court.

DATED this 26th day of September, 2019.

/s/

Kenneth K. Jorgensen

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General

1

As

the district court noted, Hull never presented evidence of her subj ective state of mind.

(R., p. 61, n. 3.)

Thus, Hull has

intent to revoke consent.

made no claim

that the statement thwarted

any subjective
would have

In other words, Hull has never argued that she

revoked her consent but for the statement.
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